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EFFECT OF SELLER'S PRIOR BREACH ON HIS RIGHT TO RESCIND FOR
BUYER'S DEFAULT
On March 18, 1947, Robberson Steel Company as seller and Stebbins
Construction Company as buyer contracted for installment deliveries of steel
to begin June 18, 1947, with payment to be made for each shipment within
thirty days of invoice date. Before the first shipment was due, a disagree-
ment arose between the parties concerning another contract and the seller
refused to ship any steel until the controversy was settled. On July 1, 1947,
the buyer by letter demanded shipment within ten days, threatening to
hold the seller liable for a breach of the contract if such shipment was not
made. The first shipment was made July 11, 1947, accepted by the buyer
and paid for. The second, third, and fourth shipments having been accepted
but not paid for, the seller gave notice that it elected to cancel the contract.
The buyer replied that it would hold the seller liable for all damages occasioned
by the failure to make further deliveries and proceeded to purchase steel
elsewhere at a price in excess of that fixed by the contract. The seller
brought suit for the price of the steel delivered and the buyer counterclaimed
for damages caused by the delay in shipment of the first installment, and for
extra expense incurred in purchasing steel elsewhere. The Court of Appeals
for the 10th Circuit allowed the seller to recover the contract price of the
steel delivered, but allowed the buyer damages on his counterclaim for both
the delay in delivery and the extra expense. Robberson Steel Company v.
Harrell, 177 F. 2d 12 (10th Cir. 1949).
The court in granting recovery on the counterclaim for extra expense
in securing steel elsewhere with which to finish the construction project
applied the broad doctrine that, "The right to repudiate a contract for the
default of the other party thereto cannot be exercised by a party who is
himself in unexcused default of an essential covenant thereof."' The court
reasoned that since the seller had been first in default by refusing to deliver
until the controversy concerning a previous contract was settled, he could
not exercise his privilege of rescinding the contract for the buyer's failure
to pay, and that in attempting to rescind he breached the contract, giving the
buyer a right to damages for a total breach. Apparently this doctrine is
widely accepted by the courts and universally applied without distinction
between cases where the second default is the natural result of the first
1. Robberson Steel Company v. Harrell, 177 F.2d 12, 17 (10th Cir. 1949).
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default 2 and cases where such casual connection is absent.3 The application
of this doctrine to the instant case raises two problems. First, is the doctrine
essentially sound as stated? Second, if the doctrine is essentially sound,
should it be applied without exception?
In order to answer these questions it is necessary to determine the
relative rights of the parties at the end of each phase of the transaction. The
first act of consequence was the seller's refusal shortly after June 13, 1947,
to ship any steel until the controversy over a previous contract was settled.
Conceding that this action was an anticipatory repudiation of the present
contract,4 the buyer had a choice of at least three courses of action: He
might have done nothing, using the default as a defense for his own non-
action; acted affirmatively to rescind the contract; or sued immediately for
a total breach of the contract, recovering as damages the difference between
the contract and market price at the date of the breach.' Even if this refusal
to ship is not considered sufficient to constitute an anticipatory repudiation, '
the refusal followed by the passage of the shipping date without shipment
being made constituted a total breach of the contract giving the buyer the
same three courses of action.'
The letter of July 1, 1947, urging the seller to make shipment within
2. When at the time of the buyer's failure to pay, the seller was himself in default
in making deliveries, the price of the goods had advanced, and the buyer withheld only
enough to protect himself against loss, the seller was not entitled to terminate the con-
tract. North Coast Lumber Co. v. Great Northern Lumber Co., 144 Minn. 304, 175
N. W. 547 (1919). 'See also, Atlas Brewing Co. v. Hoffman, 217 Iowa 1217, 252 N. W.
133 (1934); Hafner v. A. J. Stuart Land Co., 246 Mich. 465, 224 N. W. 630 (1929);
Hjorth v. Albert Lea Machinery Co., 142 Minn. 387, 172 N. W. 488 (1919).
3. White Oak Fuel Co. v. Carter, 257 Fed. 54 (8th Cir. 1919) ; California Sugar and
White Pine Agency v. Penoyer, 1667 Cal. 274, 139 Pac. 671 (1914) ; Shriver Oil Co. v.
Interocean Oil Co., 157 Md. 341, 146 Atl. 223 (1929) ; Parkhurst v. Lebanon Publishing
Co., 356 Mo. 934, 204 S. W.2d 241 (1947) ; Meyer Milling Co. v. Baker, 328 Mo. 1246,
43 S. W.2d 794 (1931) ; Stilwell v. McDonald, 100 Ore. 673, 198 Pac. 567 (1921).
4. CoRBiN, CASES ON CONTRACTS 738 (3d Ed. 1947); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
306, § 323 (1932) ; Limberg, Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts, 10 CORN. L. Q. 135,
165 (1925) ; cf. Associated Cinemas of America v. World Amusement Co., 201 Minn. 94,
276 N. W. 7 (1937).
5. Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1 (1899) ; Lagerloef Trading Co. Inc. v. American
Paper Products Co., 291 Fed. 947 (7th Cir. 1923) ; Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 El. & BI.
678 (1853) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3713, § 3714 (Rev. Ed. 1937); Limberg, Anticipa-
tory Repudiation of Contracts, 10 CORN. L. Q. 135, 138 (1925); VoId, Anticipatory
Repudiation of Contracts and Necessity of Election, 26 MIcH. L. R. 502, 506 (1924).
6. The general statement is that to constitute a breach the repudiation must be "posi-
tive, absolute, and total, or at least go to the essence." See Dingley v. Oler, 117 U. S.
490, 504 (1886) ; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 10 (1899).
7. Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., 173 U. S. 1 (1898) ; It re Man-
hattan Ice Co. 114 Fed. 399 (S. D. N. Y. 1901) ; Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299 (1879) ;
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Nexsen, 84 Ind. 347 (1882) ; St. John v. St. John, 223 Mass.
137, 111 N. E. 719 (1916); Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. 168 (1871); Husting Co. v.
Coca Cola Co., 205 Wis. 356, 237 N. W. 85 (1931); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1317,
§ 1455 et seq. (Rev. Ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 314 (1932).
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ten days cannot be considered as a waiver of the buyer's right to damages.8
Nor can the buyer be considered to have rescinded the contract since recission
demands affirmative action, and he took no such action.0 It must follow,
then, since the buyer acquired at the time of the breach the privilege of
rescinding or of suing for total breach, and neither waived any of his
privileges nor acted to rescind, that at the time of the initial shipment the
contract was in full force and effect, and the buyer retained all of its
previously acquired rights.
The shipment of July 11, 1947, was a withdrawal of the seller's repudia-
tion dnd an offer of performance after breach. As to the repudiation it is
clear that since the buyer had not rescinded the contract, brought an action,
or changed his position, the withdrawal was effective.' 0 As to the offer of
performance after breach, the prevailing view is that acceptance of the goods
by the buyer after the time fixed for the shipment precludes a rescission of
the contract; results in a waiver by the buyer of the stipulation as to time in
so far as the seller's right to recover the agreed price is concerned; but the
buyer is entitled to recoup the damages incurred by reason of the delay in
delivery.11
The next act of significance was the failure of the buyer to pay for the
second, third, and fourth deliveries. The court stated the general rule to be
that where the contract provides for deliveries in installments, with separate
payment to be made for each installment delivered, the failure to make a
8. United Press Ass'n. v. National Newspaper Ass'n., 237 Fed. 547 (8th Cir. 1916) ;
Tri-Bullion Smelting Co. v. Jacobsen, 233 Fed. 646 (2d Cir. 1916) ; Donati v. Cleveland
Grain Co., 221 Fed. 168 (4th Cir. 1915) ; Alpena Portland Cement Co. v. Backus, 156 Fed.
944 (4th Cir. 1907) ; Reindeau v. Bullock, 147 N. Y. 267, 275 (1895) ; Canda v. Wick, 100
N. Y. 127 (1885) ; Brown v. Muller, 7 Exch. 319 (1872) ; Limberg, Anticipatory Repudi-
ation of Contracts, 10 CORN. L. Q. 135, 153 (1925).
9. Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble, 153 U. S. 540, 551 (1894) ; Remington Arms Union
Metallic Cartridge Co. v. Gaynor Mfg. Co., 98 Conn. 721, 120 Atl. 572 (1923) ; Stuffer v.
Carbondale Mills, Inc., 196 N. Y. Supp. 266, 119 Misc. 374 (1922) ; Elterman v. Hyman,
192 N. Y. 113, 126 (1908).
10. Rederiaktiebolaget Amie v. Universal Transp. Co., 250 Fed. 400 (2d Cir. 1918);
Kadish v. Young, 108 Ill. 170 (1893) ; Iowa Mausoleum Co. v. Wright, 170 Iowa 546, 153
N. W. 94 (1915); Carolisle v. Green, 131 S. W. 1140 (Texas 1910).
11. Purington Paving Brick Co. v. Metropolitan Paving Co., 4 F.2d 676 (8th Cir.
1925); Frankfurt-Barnett Co. v. William Prym Co., 237 Fed. 21 (2d Cir. 1916);
Steininger Construction Co. v. Bates, 159 Ark. 416, 252 S. W. 618 (1923) ; Stephens v.
Weyl-Zuckerman & Co., 33 Cal. App. 566, 165 Pac. 975 (1917) ; Medart Patent Pulley
Co. v. Dubuque Turbine & Roller Mill Co., 121 Iowa 244, 96 N. W. 770 (1903) ; Nichols
& Shepard Co. v. Parker, 133 Kan. 709, 3 P.2d 462 (1931) ; Johnson v. North Baltimore
Bottle Glass Co., 74 Kan. 762, 88 Pac. 52 (1906) ; Howard v. Thompson Lumber Co.,
106 Ky. 566, 50 S. W. 1092 (1899) ; Bagby v. Walker, 78 Md. 239, 27 Atl. 1033 (1893) ;
Buick Motor Co. v. Reid Manufacturing Co., 150 Mich. 118, 113 N. W. 591 (1907);
Redlands Orange Grower's Association v. Gorman, 161 Mo. 203, 61 S. W. 820 (1901) ;
Sundt v. Tobin Quarries, 50 N. M. 254, 175 P.2d 684 (1946) ; Builder's Supply & Equip-
ment Corp. v. Gadd, 183 N. C. 447, 111 S. E. 771 (1922) ; Allen v. Blyth, 173 Wash. 409,
23 P.2d 367 (1933).
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payment as scheduled may be treated by the seller as a breach of the entire
contract.'2  Though this statement by the court is essentially correct, it is
generally qualified in this respect: If the failure to pay on time is the direct
consequence of a prior default of the seller, then the buyer may be justified in
withholding payment.' 3 This situation occurs when the buyer withholds
payment on subsequent shipments for the purpose of insuring himself against
loss of the damages to which he is entitled because of a prior breach of the
seller. In such a case the amount withheld must bear some reasonable relation
to the amount of damages suffered as a consequence of the prior breach, and
the buyer must notify the seller of the purpose for which payment is with-
held. 14 In the instant case there was no indication that it was the seller's
prior breach which induced the buyer's default; therefore the buyer was not
justified in refusing to pay.
The above analysis shows that normally a seller in Robberson's position
at the time the suit was brought has the privilege of treating the buyer's
refusal to pay as a total breach and refusing to proceed further under the
contract. Such a seller may also sue for the price of the steel delivered. By
the same analysis, the buyer waived all other privileges by accepting the ship-
ments after the time specified in the contract except a privilege of counter-
claiming for loss occasioned by the delay in delivery of the first installment.
The court followed this reasoning but defeated its logical conclusion by
blindly applying the general rule that a party who is himself in default cannot
rescind a contract. By this ruling the court forever barred the seller from
exercising his privilege of rescinding for subsequent breaches by the buyer.
The decision cannot be rationalized on the theory that the buyer retained
his privilege of suing for total breach and accepted shipment merely to mitigate
damages. A buyer in accepting late deliveries under an installment contract
retains only a privilege of suing for damages already suffered as a result of
the late delivery.' 5 However, even if it were assumed that he retains a
privilege of suing for total breach, the rule of mitigation can have no applica-
tion. The breach of a contract of sale by the seller where the article purchased
has a market value places the buyer under no obligation to buy from others..
The amount of damages in such a case is the difference between the contract
price and the market price at the time of the breach and is unaffected by the
actions of the parties subsequent to the breach. 16
12. See Robberson Steel Co. v. Harrell, 177 F.2d 12, 16 (10th Cir. 1949).
13. Bradley v. King, 44 II, 339 (1867) ; Atlas Brewing Co. v. Hoffman, 217 Iowa
1217 (1934) ; Reiser v. Lawrence, 96 W. Va. 82, 123 S. E. 451 (1924).
14. Bradley v. King, 44 I. 339 (1869).
15. See note 11 supra.
16. Saxe v. Penoke Lumber Co., 159 N. Y. 371 (1899); 5 WILLISTON, CoNRaACTS
§ 1383; Limberg, Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts, 10 CoRN. L. Q. 135, 175 (1925);
Cf. UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT, § 113; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-712 (1949).
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In allowing recovery of extra expense incurred by the buyer in securing
steel elsewhere with which to finish the job, the court must have reasoned
that the seller's attempted rescission after the buyer's failure to pay was an
anticipatory repudiation. To recover damages resulting from anticipatory
repudiation tender of performance need not be made, but the aggrieved party
must allege that he is ready, willing, and able to perform.17 Surely a buyer
who is in unexcused default on three scheduled payments cannot truthfully
allege that he is ready, willing, and able to perform.
This decision in addition to giving the buyer the right to sue for the
damages resulting from late delivery of the initial installment, deprived the
seller of the protection of his conditions precedent. Normally failure to per-
form a condition precedent excuses performance by the other party.18  Here
the court held that a party first in default can no longer treat the failure of
the other party to perform a condition precedent as an excuse for his own
subsequent non-performance. In a real sense the sanctions imposed by the
court here are penal in nature. The normal measure of contract damages
is the amount- necessary to put the injured party in as good a position as he
would have occupied had the contract been completely performed. The result
here goes far beyond this measure, and in addition to making the buyer
whole, 9 withholds from the seller its normal substantive rights.
One purpose of installment contracts is to limit the credit extended to
the buyer by requiring payment following each shipment. This decision
forces the seller to continue shipments after the buyer has failed to make
scheduled payments, which has the practical effect of requiring the seller to
extend more credit than was bargained for. This sanction bears no relation
to the original default of the seller. The severity of the penalty is directly
related to the ability of the buyer to pay for the additional shipments rather
than to the harm caused by the seller's original default. A man of ordinary
business intelligence would normally expect that an unjustified refusal of a
buyer to make an installment payment when due would excuse the seller from
extending further credit. The trend of modern contract thinking is towards
achieving legal results that the normal business man would expect to flow
17. Grey v. Smith, 83 Fed. 824 (9th Cir. 1897) ; Linton v. Allen, 154 Mass. 432, 28
N. E. 780 (1891); Dosch v. Andrus, 111 Minn. 287, 126 N. W. 1071 (1910) ; Bigler v.
Morgan, 77 N. Y. 312 (1879).
18. Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188 (1885) ; Warren v. Stoddard, 105 U. S. 224
(1882) ; Davis v. Cotton State Life Insurance Co., 232 Fed. 343 (5th Cir. 1916) ; Skehan
v. Rummel, 124 Ind. 347, 24 N. E. 1089 (1890) ; Rosenthaf Paper Co. v. National Folding
Box & Paper Co., 226 N. Y. 313 (1919) ; Jansen v. Schneider, 78 Misc. 48, 138 N. Y.
Supp. 144 (1912) ; Kingston v. Preston, 2 Doug. 689 (1781), quoted in Jones v. Barkley,
2 Doug. 684 (1781) ; RESTATEMENT, CONrACrS § 269, § 274 (1932).
19. An award of damages for delay in the initial delivery was the only remedy to
which the buyer was entitled. See note 11 supra.
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from particular situations and away from strict legalistic interpretations. 0
If this approach had been used here, the seller would have been permitted to
rescind.
The above analysis shows that the court in applying the general rule
without analyzing its effect was clearly in error. Further, the general rule
as stated is unsound, and should be altered to read: "A party who is himself
in default in performance of a contract cannot rescind for a subsequent failure
of performance having a causal connection wtih his own default." The
application of the doctrine as modified would have reached the correct solution
of allowing the seller to rescind the contract for the default of the buyer,
subject, however, to damages for late delivery of the initial installment.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
EFFECT OF HEART BALM ACTS ON INFANT'S RIGHT TO SUE FOR THE
ENTICEMENT OF HIS PARENT
The mother of infant children was enticed away from the children and
family home by Hicks. By their father as next friend, the children sued
for damages resulting from the enticement. The Federal District Court
allowed the action although a Michigan heart-balm statute had abolished
actions for alienation of affections. The court reasoned that a cause of action
should be recognized in favor of the children and that the heart-balm statute,
being intended to abolish only the traditional alienation-of-affections suit,
did not bar the children's action. Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281, (W. D.
Mich. 1949).
In allowing the action the court surmounted two barriers: it first recog-
nized a new cause of action to protect the children's interest in the parental
relation and then determined the action to be outside the purview of an
existing heart-balm statute.' There are indications of a trend to liberalize
tort law in favor of the infant.2 Three appellate courts, faced with facts
similar to those in this case, have upheld the infant's action for injury to
his interest in the security of the parental relation.3 But the action has been
20. The UNIFORm REVISED SALES Acr and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE which pre-
sumably will soon be in effect in many jurisdictions are excellent examples of this
trend. See Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L. 3.
1341 (1948) ; Comment, 57 YALE L. 3. 1360, 1360-1366 (1948).
1. "All civil causes of action for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and
seduction of any person of the age of 18 years or more, and all causes of action for
breach of contract to marry are hereby abolished.. MIcH. Comp. LAWS (1948) § 551.301.
2. Note, 35 VA. L. REv. 618 (1949).
3. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). This decision was the first to
recognize a cause of action in the minor child where the father was enticed from the"
home. The decision provoked wide comment, and is noted in 13 U. OF CHL. L. REv. 375
(1946); 41 ILL. L. REv. 444 (1946) ; 25 CHI-KENT REv. 90 (1946); 59 HARv. L. REv. 297
(1945) ; 46 COL. L. REv. 464 (1946); 15 FORD. L. REv. 126 (1946); 30 MiNN. L. REv. 310
